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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL 
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 880606-CA 
Category 14b 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal on the Amended Judgment on the verdict 
entered June 23, 1988, after jury trial. On October 19, 1988, 
the Supreme Court poured this case over to the above-entitled 
court as provided in Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4) and this 
Court has entertained jurisdiction as authorized by 
§78-2a-3(2)(h). 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant Bank seeks affirmance of the Amended Judgment on 
verdict and amendment of paragraph 3 of that Judgment as an 
obvious mistake, conceded by plaintiff's Amended brief, 
ISSUES 
The value of the property at the time of the conversion is 
the measure of plaintiff's damages less recoupment or setoff 
allowed to the parties. Plaintiff adamantly denied throughout 
the trial that Smedley was entitled to any offset for the road 
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and culvert work done pursuant to the terms of the agreement 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) but the jury found against Smedley on 
that issue and deducted from the $35,000.00 stipulated value the 
allotted road work value of $20,139.00 and the balance due on the 
promissory note in the sum of $14,275.00. Plaintiff alleged and 
the jury found conspiracy on the part of the Bank to convert 
plaintiff's interest in the well drilling rig. By finding 
conspiracy, the jury supplied the mutuality of obligation which 
plaintiff alleges is lacking as to the Bank and by becoming a 
co-conspirator, the Bank was entitled to all of the offsets that 
Smedley was entitled to. 
Against plaintiff's denials, the jury found that Smedley was 
entitled to credit for the road and culvert work done pursuant to 
the agreement. Smedley's good faith claim to a substantial 
interest in the drilling rig was therefore confirmed by the jury 
and the Bank's reliance upon Smedley1s claimed interest was a 
substantial part of conspiracy charged against the Bank, and the 
conduct of the Bank as a co-conspirator was therefore also under 
a claim of right as indicated by the jury and the court properly 
refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant First National Bank of Layton (hereinafter "Bank") 
adopts the Statement of Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief at 
pages 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the following additions and exceptions: 
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1. Smedley and the Bank did not develop a plan to obtain 
the equity in the drilling rig and apply it against Smedley's 
loan with the Bank." Dale Smedley suffered a heart attack and 
was behind in his payments to the Bank and his sons advised 
Dennis Brown, a bank officer, that General Electric Credit 
Corporation had given notice of foreclosure on the drilling rig 
because plaintiff had refused to pay the note and Smedley was 
fearful that their equity in the drilling rig would be lost and 
that they would be willing to apply their equity in the drilling 
rig to their indebtedness at defendant Bank. (emphases added) 
(Brown Dep. P. 10 L. 1) 
2. Defendant Smedley represented to the Bank that the 
drilling rig had a value of approximately $30,000.00 (Brown Dep. 
P. 21 L. 18) and that Smedley's equity in the drill rig was equal 
to or greater than its value. (R-137) 
3. Because of the representation of defendant Smedley, the 
Bank doubted that plaintiff would pay the balance due on the note 
and therefore agreed to purchase the note and security interest 
of GECC, but the Bank followed the advice of counsel in 
foreclosing its interest in the drilling rig (Brown Dep. P. 13 L. 
10; P. 14) and the notice of sale that was sent to plaintiff was 
also sent to defendant Smedley (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). 
4. The reason defendant Smedley could perform no more work 
on the property to entirely pay the $65,000.00 for the drilling 
rig is that plaintiff used the real property on which the work 
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was to be done as collateral on a loan and the property was 
foreclosed by plaintiff's creditor preventing Smedley from doing 
further work. (R-154) 
5. Smedley had money in its account with the Bank to 
support the check tendered to redeem the drilling rig. The 
reason the Bank didn't cash Smedley's check until after Doxey had 
bought from Smedley is that the Bank could not get title to the 
drilling rig from GECC and did not cash the redemption check 
until it could deliver title. (See Defendant's Exhibit 12) 
6. It is true that Smedley refused to deliver the drill 
rig to plaintiff because plaintiff had already stated its 
intention to sell the rig and would not acknowledge any equity in 
the rig by reason of Smedley's work on the road and culverts. 
Plaintiff did not want the well drilling rig but did want the 
contract value of $65,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THOUGH DEPENDANT SMEDLEY AFFIRMATIVELY 
PLED SETOFF, THE DEFENSE WAS ACTUALLY FOR 
RECOUPMENT. 
Courts often treat setoff and recoupment as the same but 
there is an important distinction between the two concepts. In 
most instances pure setoff requires mutuality of obligation and 
involves claims that are not part of the same transaction 
Milgrim v. DeLucaf 487 A. 2d 522 (Conn. 1985) but recoupment is a 
defense growing out of the transaction constituting the 
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plaintiff's claim for relief; and is available to reduce or 
satisfy the plaintiff's claim but cannot be the basis for 
affirmative relief. Granmo v. Superior Court in and for Pima 
Co., 596 P.2d 36, 38 (Ariz. App. 1979). 
In the absence of a showing of prejudice, equity requires a 
right of recoupment. Freston v. Gulf Oil Company-U.S., 565 P.2d 
787 (Utah 1977). Recoupment exists in equity as well as at 
common law and is equitable in nature. It is applied in 
reduction of the affirmative claim to the extent that reason and 
conscience permit and is not a separate cause of action but 
applies to mitigate or limit an otherwise valid recovery. 
The thrust of plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Bank 
initially was that the Bank wrongfully disposed of plaintiff's 
property when the Bank did not accept plaintiff's tender and 
"sold" the drill rig to defendant Smedley. (R. 9-10) Plaintiff 
then amended its Complaint and alleged UCC violations in addition 
to wrongful disposition and conspiracy to convert. The Bank knew 
it did not have an independent cause of action that would support 
setoff or counterclaim and the Bank therefore had to rely upon 
Smedley's claim because that's what the Bank relied upon in 
getting involved in an attempt to salvage Smedley's equity. The 
right to reduce plaintiff's claim by recoupment exists as long as 
the plaintiff's cause of action exists because it is limited by 
the amount of plaintiff's claim, is defensive in nature, and 
affords no relief in excess of plaintiff's claim. 20 Am. Jur. 2d 
Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff §6 P. 232; §12 P. 236. 
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Equitable setoff is in the nature of recoupment, and does 
not require mutuality of obligation nor must it support an 
independent obligation or counterclaim. In Atchison County 
Farmer's Union Co-op Association v. Turnbull, 736 P.2d 917 (Kan. 
1987) the Supreme Court of Kansas said at page 921: 
Equitable setoffs of unmatured obligations may be 
allowed under special circumstances, such as insolvency 
of the obligor or probable difficulty in collecting the 
obligation at maturity, but such setoffs are largely 
within the court's discretion. 
An equitable setoff will be allowed when the party 
seeking it shows some equitable ground therefor, and 
it is necessary to promote justice, to avoid or prevent 
wrong or irremediable injustice, or to give affect to 
a clear equity of the party seeking it. 
The jury was fully informed as to the participation of the 
Bank and the reasons therefore and by instructing the jury on 
conspiracy, upon a finding of conspiracy the Bank became 
subrogated to all of the rights and obligations of Smedley. By 
asserting conspiracy, plaintiff puts the Bank in the same 
position as an equitable subrogee, putting the Bank in Smedley1s 
shoes as to the conversion cause of action. See International 
Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Indus. Park Co., 695 P.2d 
1255 (Idaho 1985). Exercising its equitable discretion the trial 
court was therefore correct in permitting the jury to setoff 
credits for the road and culvert work done by Smedley and the 
balance due on the note which plaintiff failed to pay and any 
judgment of plaintiff against the Bank. 
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Plaintiff submitted its case to the jury under two theories: 
breach of contract for which plaintiff claimed the sum of 
$65,000.00 due and owing allowing no credit for work done by 
defendant Smedley (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2); and secondly for 
conversion, stipulating that the value of the drill rig at the 
time of conversion was $35,000.00. Conspiracy only goes to the 
conversion and sale of the drilling rig and the Bank became 
involved on the strength of Smedley1s representation that the 
drilling rig was worth about $40,000.00 and that Smedley had in 
excess of $30,000.00 equity in the drilling rig and that is the 
equity that defendant Bank agreed to take in part payment of 
Smedley1s debt to the Bank. In spite of defendant Smedley1s 
representations to the Bank and the allegations set forth in his 
Answer, his testimony at the trial supported a setoff of only 
$20,139.00 for work done on the road and a $14,275.00 payment on 
the note. Had defendant Smedley1s testimony supported road work 
equal to $30,000.00 as he represented to the Bank and as set 
forth in his Answer, and had the jury so found, the jury verdict 
would have been in favor of the Bank and against the plaintiff 
under any theory of conversion or conspiracy because the measure 
of damages for conversion is different than the damages for 
breach of contract. It begs credulity to believe that had the 
jury found no breach of contract but instead rendered a verdict 
of conversion and conspiracy to convert against Smedley and the 
Bank then Smedley and the Bank could not deduct the road work 
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found by the jury to be worth $20,139.00, and the note balance of 
$14,275.00 from the $35,000.00 verdict. (R-484) 
POINT II 
THE JURY POUND THAT THE BANK CONSPIRED WITH 
DEFENDANT SMEDLEY TO CONVERT ONLY THE 
PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN THE DRILLING RIG. 
Because the plaintiff submitted its case on two different 
theories of recovery, the jury had a right to apply all setoffs 
or recoupment to each theory upon which they rendered a verdict. 
Defendant Smedley redeemed the collateral and then sold without 
any notice to or control in the defendant Bank and the only way 
plaintiff could tie the Bank to Smedley was the conspiracy theory 
but conspiracy in and of itself does not constitute a cause of 
action. Tapscott v. Fowler, 437 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1983). In 
Lindbeck v. Bendziunas, 498 P.2d 1364 (N.M. App. 1972) the court 
said at page 1370: 
In a civil action, however, the basis for relief 
is not the conspiracy but the damages caused by acts 
permitted pursuant to the conspiracy. 
Where two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act 
done by either in furtherance of a common design and in 
accordance with the general plan becomes the act of all and each 
conspirator is responsible for each act. Vaughan v. Hornaman, 
403 P.2d 943 (Kan. 1965); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage, 598 P.2d 45 
(Cal. 1979). As hereinafter set forth defendant Bank does not 
believe that it was guilty of any unlawful conspiracy with 
defendant Smedley but the jury so found and the Bank did not 
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cross appeal. But neither plaintiff nor the jury has a right to 
pick or choose only the liabilities of conspiracy and not the 
benefits that go with it. Defendant Bank did not allege 
recoupment or setoff as to the road work done by Smedley and 
indeed could not without admitting to being a conspirator. In 
like manner, plaintiff could make no cause of action against the 
Bank unless plaintiff alleged conspiracy but plaintiff in 
alleging the conspiracy, and the jury in finding conspiracy to 
exist under the instructions given by the court, must also accord 
to the Bank as a co-conspirator all of the benefits to which 
Smedley was entitled. In its sound discretion the trial court so 
instructed the jury and the jury made an equitable decision as to 
what was fair and reasonable based on the Bank's participation 
and the overall "conspiracy." 
POINT III 
THE JURY VERDICT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. 
As shown by the record, it was apparent to the jury that in 
becoming involved in the transaction, defendant Bank had relied 
on defendant Smedley1s representations of equity in the drilling 
rig. Regardless of plaintiff's representations in the pleadings 
and at trial, the jury accepted defendant Smedley's position that 
he in fact did have an equity in the drilling rig equal to 
$34,414.00 and the parties stipulated that the value of the 
drilling rig was $35,000.00 when sold by defendant Smedley. 
Therefore, the only equity plaintiff had in the drilling rig as 
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to the cause of action for conversion was the amount of the 
judgment against the Bank. 
The jury followed Instruction Number 31 to the letter and 
that is very apparent in the verdict form the jury submitted to 
the court. The jury scratched out the $65,000.00 verdict in 
favor of plaintiff and against Smedley and deducted from that 
figure the $34,414.00 in credits due Smedley and granted judgment 
for $30,586.00. (Appendix B, R-440) Under Under plaintiff's 
theory of the case, the Bank doesn't even get credit for the 
balance due from plaintiff on the promissory note and the costs 
of sale. Instruction Number 31 is specifically directed to the 
conversion cause of action, and the conspiracy as pled by 
plaintiff, tried to the jury, and found by the jury relates only 
to conversion, not the breach of contract action. It is further 
evident that the jury did not misinterpret plaintiff's theories 
of recovery because the court specifically instructed the jury as 
to plaintiff's breach of contract theory in Instruction Number 16 
(Appendix A herein) and plaintiff's conversion theory in 
Instruction Number 17 (Appendix A) and the burden of proof on 
Smedley set forth in Instruction Number 21 (Appendix A). Once 
the jury determined that there was in fact a conspiracy the Bank 
was totally dependent on Smedley's proof as to the amount of 
recoupment or equitable setoff. 
Plaintiff took exception to the court's instructions on 
damages, alleging that the Bank should be equally liable with 
-11-
Smedley on the breach of contract theory, but the court 
specifically rejected that argument and ruled that there was no 
evidence in the trial that would even remotely connect the Bank 
with defendant Smedley's breach of contract if any. (T-l and 2). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 
Even though the jury did find conversion on the part of 
Smedley and conspiracy on the part of the Bank, the jury also 
vindicated Smedley1s rightful claim to all of the value of the 
drilling rig except $586,00 amended to $836.00 by the court's 
additur. Smedley1s claim of an interest in the drilling rig was 
therefore bona fide and in good faith and the Bank relied on and 
is entitled to Smedley1s bona fides. To make sure that the jury 
understood the damage issues, the court added Instruction Number 
36a at the specific request of counsel for plaintiff after the 
initial Instructions were given by the court. (R-421, see 
Appendix A) 
In Amos v. Broadbent, 514 P.2d 1284, (Utah 1973), defendant 
purchased cattle from a prior owner of a ranch who had already 
sold the ranch and cattle to the plaintiff. When plaintiff's 
ranch foreman discovered that the cattle were missing he called 
at the defendant's ranch to take possession of the cattle but the 
defendant threatened to charge him with trespassing if he didn't 
leave immediately claiming that he had purchased the cattle from 
the owner. Plaintiff charged the defendant with conversion of 
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plaintiff's cattle and the court allowed the issue of punitive 
damages to go to the jury. In reversing the trial court on the 
issue of punitive damages the Supreme Court said at page 
1286-1287: 
..•The evidence shows some high-handed conduct on 
the part of the defendant in dealing with 
plaintiff's foreman Dan Brown and in the 
defendant's conduct in retaining the cattle and 
disposing of them. However, a fair appraisal of 
the record would show that defendant had purchased 
the cattle from Bennion and that Bennion had 
claimed ownership of the cattle and the right to 
sell the same, and also that Bennion offered to 
defend the defendant's title and ownership when 
the sale was completed. It would thus appear that 
the defendant's refusal to surrender the cattle to 
the plaintiff was under a claim of right and would 
not support a finding that defendant acted in a 
reckless, wanton, or malicious way in disregard of 
the rights of the plaintiff. A wrongful act is 
not in and of itself a sufficient basis to award 
punitive damages. 
In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) the court 
said at page 774: 
The standard for punitive damages in non-false 
imprisonment cases is thus clear: they may be 
imposed for conduct that is willful and malicious 
or that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference and disregard toward the rights of 
others. 
In the case at bar, the defendants believed the evidence 
would show the amount due defendant Smedley from plaintiff for 
work on the roads and culverts to be somewhat greater that the 
$20,139.00 awarded by the jury. There was therefore no evidence 
of "a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard toward the 
rights of others" and certainly no "conduct that is willful and 
malicious" on the part of the defendant Bank. 
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Secondly, defendant Bank at all times was relying upon the 
advice of its attorney, Thomas W. Seiler, in connection with this 
transaction (Brown Dep. P. 13-18). Punitive damages are 
generally not recoverable against the defendant who acts in good 
faith upon the advice of counsel. U.S. Through Farmer's Home 
Administration v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985) 
CONCLUSION 
The jury was diligent in following the instructions of the 
court and in applying the law to the facts found by the jury to 
exist. Instruction Number 31, taken together with Instruction 
Numbers 14, 16, 17, and 36a are correct statements of the law and 
clearly set forth plaintiff's theories of recovery. With regard 
to the conversion claim of the plaintiff, the jury did assess the 
damages exactly the same for defendant Smedley and defendant 
Bank, but the court correctly ruled that defendant Bank was not 
involved in any possible breach of contract by defendant Smedley. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum filed with the court April 5, 1988, 
clearly shows plaintiff's recognition that defendant Smedley's 
affirmative defense was one in recoupment and equitable setoff 
rather than setoff in the nature of a counterclaim. (R. 291) 
Defendant Bank believed it had done nothing illegal or improper 
nor that it had engaged in any illegal or improper procedure and 
the Bank therefore did not admit to a joint venture of conspiracy 
with defendant Smedley in its pleadings and could not set forth 
affirmative defenses without doing so. In like manner, plaintiff 
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had no cause of action against the Bank without alleging and 
proving conspiracy. The Bank is therefore entitled to the 
benefits as well as the liabilities of that relationship. In its 
argument on page 8 of its brief, plaintiff admits that 
Instruction 31 requires a judgment against the Bank in the same 
amount as the judgment against Smedley and the Instruction by its 
terms applies only to the conversion theory. The verdict forms 
returned by the jury clearly show that the jury did grant 
judgment against Smedley on the conversion theory in exactly the 
same amount as the jury found against the Bank. Under the 
provisions of Instruction 36a, the jury granted judgment against 
defendant Smedley in a substantially greater amount under the 
breach of contract theory and the jury was therefore properly 
instructed as to the damages that could be assessed against the 
defendant Bank and the manner in which the damages were to be 
calculated based on the jury's other findings. 
The trial court properly refused plaintiff's request for an 
instruction on punitive damages because there was no evidence 
presented to the jury that would support such an instruction. 
Indeed, the jury verdict shows that defendant Smedley did have a 
valid interest in the well drilling rig and an instruction for 
punitive damages would have clearly been erroneous. 
For these reasons the judgment on verdict should be affirmed 
as corrected. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Selected Jury Instuctions 
INSTRUCTION NO. |fj[ 
In the matter before you the plaintiff claims that 
defendant Smedley failed to repay $65,000 which he owed the 
plaintiff; that defendant Smedley converted an interest in 
property belonging to the plaintiff to his own use; and that 
Smedley sold an interest in property belonging to the plaintiff 
to one Doxey in violation of Utah Law and this damaged plaintiff* 
Plaintiff further claims that the defendant bank conspired 
with defendant Smedley in said conversion and wrongful sale 
to Doxey and as a result is jointly liable to plaintiff with 
Smedley. 
Defendant Smedley denys the claims of plaintiff and 
claims that plaintiff breached their agreement to pay GECC $12,500 
and to give defendant Smedley credit for work he performed on 
the project and access thereto and thereby damaged defendant 
Smedley and that said damage more than offsets any damage which 
may have been caused to plaintiff. 
Further defendant Smedley claims that plaintiff 
waived any claim for conversion or wrongful sale to Doxey by 
failure to reasonably protect their property interest. 
Defendant bank claims that defendant Smedley redeemed 
the rig as provided by law and that the bank had no further 
duty to the parties and did not conspire with Smedley in any 
claimed conversion or wrongful sale. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1^ . 
You are instructed that the Court has found the written agreements entered 
into between the parties to be inconsistent and ambiguous, and, therefore, has allowed 
oral testimony to explain the intent of the parties and the meaning of the agreements. 
You must find, as best you can, the intent or agreement of the parties from the entire 
body of evidence, that is, the agreements, the testimony and the exhibits. 
INSTRUCTION NO, lfc 
In order for plaintiff to recover under breach of 
contract against defendant Smedley, plaintiff must prove all of 
the following propositions by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That defendant Smedley agreed to pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $65,000, 
2. That defendant Smedley has not paid the same. 
INSTRUCTION NO. '7 
In order to prove conversion, the plaintiff has 
the burden to prove the following propositions by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the plaintiff was entitled to possession 
of the drilling rig? 
2. That the plaintiff demanded possession of the 
drilling rig from the defendant; 
3. That the defendant refused to return the rig to 
the plaintiff; and, 
4. That the defendant took the rig or proceeds 
from the sale of the rig to it's own use and benefit; and, 
5. That the plaintiff was damaged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2\ 
In order for defendant Smedley to prove that plaintiff 
breached the agreement between the parties, Smedley has to 
prove all of the following propositions by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
1. That the parties entered into an agreement 
whereby plaintiff agreed to pay $12,500 to EGCC? and/or, 
2. That the parties agreed that defendant would be 
allowed to do work on the project or access for 
which plaintiff would give him credit; and/or, 
3. That plaintiff refused to pay the sum owing 
to GECC; and/or, 
4. That defendant did work on said project or access 
and the reasonable value thereof; 
5. That plaintiff failed to give credit to defendant 
for the work done; 
6. That the ^ erendant has been damaged thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2>\ 
In the event you find the bank has conspired with 
Smedley as heretofore instructed, you should also enter judgment 
against the bank for the amount of any judgment against Smedley 
for conversion or wrongful sale* 
INSTRUCTION NO. J£fc 
You are instructed that you may find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant Smedley and reach a verdict 
consistant with these instructions. You may also find in favor 
of the plaintiff and against both defendants consistent with 
these instructions so as to return two consistent verdicts in 
favor of the plaintiff, however, if you find against Smedley in 
both instances the amount of the joint verdict against both 
Smedley and the Bank will be deducted by the Court from the 
amount you award in the verdict form against Smedley alone so as 
to prevent a double recovery. 
Nothing contained herein requires that you do either or 
both and you are instructed that you are free to return a verdict 
as you see fit based upon the evidence and facts as you find them 
under the law. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Jury Verdict 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY, and 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i Civil Action No. 
1
 VERDICT 
40864 
WE THE JURY empaneled in the above entitled matter, 
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant Smedley and award damages in the following sum: 
^W-C fl 
? ^C^^JS."3o&<->**• 
Signed this k) day of April, 1988. 
Foreperson 
